Hello everyone,
Below are the summaries of this week's civil decisions released by our Court of Appeal. Areas of law covered include Municipal Law, Civil Procedure, Administrative Law, Contracts, Family Law, Crown Liability, Condominium Law, and Real Property Law.
Please feel free to share this blog with anyone whom you think would be interested. As always, we welcome your comments and feedback. Have a great weekend.
CIVIL DECISIONS
Foley v. St. Marys (Town), 2016 ONCA 528
[Pepall, Tulloch and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
M. Cook, for the appellants
T. J. Hill, E. P. Costello and M. A. Cowan, for the respondent
Keywords: Municipal Law, Heritage Building, Ontario Heritage Act, Application to Quash Bylaw, Illegality, Municipal Act, 2001, s. 273(5), Limitation Period, Fixtures, Chattels
Facts:
This appeal concerns a municipal heritage designation of a landmark commercial property located in the downtown core of St. Marys, Ontario. In 1884, a two-storey brick and stone building was constructed in St. Marys for a local jeweller. For over a century, the building was home to the family jeweller shop. The shop's interior contained walnut showcases, counters, mirrors, and a tall wall clock. In 2004, the appellants purchased the property from the family jewellers and leased it until 2010.
In 2007 the respondent, the Corporation of the Town of St. Marys wrote the appellants to introduce the possibility of a heritage designation for the property. The appellants said they were not interested in participating in the process. The Town later advised that they would proceed without the appellants' support. In January, 2008 the Town attempted to provide formal notice to the appellants of its intention to pass a bylaw designating the building as a heritage building, but they did not write out the proper postal code on the notice, and the appellants consequently claimed they never received it. However, the appellants did admit to seeing the Town's notice of 'intent to designate' published in the local newspaper in accordance with the provisions of the Ontario Heritage Act. The town did not receive any objections to the designation.
In February, 2008, the Town passed bylaw 14-2008, which designated the appellants' property a heritage building. The designation included the original exterior and interior heritage attributes. In August 2009, the appellants successfully applied for and received municipal heritage funding from the Town based on the heritage designation. The appellants again successfully applied for additional heritage funding in Oct. 2009. On December 2, 2009, the Town registered the heritage designation bylaw on title to the appellants' property in accordance with the provisions of the OHA. In early 2010, the appellants attended a Town Hall meeting where one of the appellants, Mr. Foley, was presented with a designation plaque. In June 2010, the appellants listed the property for sale, and after not receiving much interest they blamed the Town and their heritage designation of the interior features of the building as the cause of their inability to sell the property.
The appellants applied for an order quashing the bylaw for illegality and, in the alternative, severing those parts of the bylaw that purported to designate the interior features, fixtures and chattels of the building. They also sought interlocutory injunctive relief and damages for unlawful interference. The application judge dismissed the application. Given the error in the postal code, he concluded that the Town could not meet its onus of proving that notice was properly given under s. 67 of the OHA. However, he found that the appellants had actual notice of the notice of designation and failure to strictly comply with s. 67 of the OHA rendered the designating bylaw voidable, and not void ab initio as argued by the appellants. He then held that the one year limitation period in s. 273(5) of the Municipal Act, 2001 was dispositive of the application to quash. He therefore dismissed the application, including the alternative claim to quash the bylaw in part by severing all reference to the interior features from the designation.
He further concluded that the Town's authority to designate was limited to real property including fixtures, but that the walnut showcase, counters, mirrors, and the wall clock, were fixtures. The appellants argue that the application judge erred in finding that the heritage designation was not void ab initio given the lack of notice and for concluding that the interior features were fixtures, rather than chattels, and that they were therefore real property.
Issues:
(1) Did the application judge err in finding that the heritage designation was not void ab initio?
(2) Did the application judge err in concluding that the interior features were fixtures rather than chattels?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) No. The application judge's conclusion was fully supported by the law. In reaching his determination, he relied on Re Clements & Toronto, [1960] O.R. 18 (C.A.). That decision dealt with a largely similar predecessor provision of the Municipal Act, 2001 and an application to quash. A lower court had quashed a bylaw on the basis that it was void ab initio. Relying on the limitation period in the Municipal Act, this court had overturned that decision due to the failure of the applicant to bring the notice of application within one year after the passing of the bylaw. It did so notwithstanding the finding that the bylaw was void ab initio.
(2) Not decided. The application judge was correct in dismissing the application in full on the basis of the limitation period. There is therefore no need to address his findings on the scope of the designation (of chattel vs. fixtures).
Baradaran v. Alexanian, 2016 ONCA 533
[Rouleau, van Rensburd and Benotto J.J.A.]
Counsel:
M. Baradaran, acting in person
L. Century and C. Sinclair, for the respondents
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings,
No Reasonable Cause of Action, Friviolous, Vexatious, Abuse of
Process, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 21.01(3)(d) and
25.11, Summary Judgment, Rule 20
Facts:
The appellant commenced an action against the respondent Alexanian, a lawyer, his law firm and his professional corporation. He claimed damages for breach of certain "service agreements" under which he claimed to be owed fees for working on Alexanian's client files. He also claimed solicitors' negligence in respect to five actions in the Superior Court. The respondents moved to strike, without leave to amend, paragraphs 17 to 21 of the statement of claim. The motion judge granted the motion and struck the impugned paragraphs without leave to amend, finding them to be "clearly vexatious and an abuse of process."
Issues:
(1) Whether the motion judge erred in approaching the motion to strike the pleadings under rules 21.01(3)(d) and 25.11 as though he were determining a motion to a summary judgment motion.
Holding: Appeal allowed.
Reasoning:
(1) Yes. The motion judge erred in approaching the motion to strike pleadings, under rules 21.01(3)(d) and 25.11, as though he were determining a motion for summary judgment under rule 20. The motion judge accepted the solicitor's evidence that the appellant had been advised that two of the actions the respondent had been retained to litigate were ill-conceived and accepted this account of what had transpired while failing to address obvious inconsistencies in the evidence.
The purpose of a motion to strike paragraphs in a statement of claim is to weed out claims that have no possibility of success. When so doing, the court must consider whether to grant leave to amend. A summary judgment motion, by contrast, can only be brought after pleadings are exchanged. The court will only strike out a claim on the basis that it is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court, in the clearest of cases and where it is plain and obvious that the case cannot succeed. The ability to file evidence on a pleadings motion in some circumstances does not change the character of the motion, which is not to determine the merits but rather to decide if the pleadings should be struck as having no chance of success because it is frivolous and vexatious or an abuse of process. Rule 20 permits a summary judgment motion to be brought only after pleadings have been exchanged. In this case, no statement of defence had been delivered.The order striking paragraphs of the appellant's statement of claim was set aside, as was the order for substantial indemnity costs against the appellant.
Dioguardi Tax Law v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 531
[MacPherson, Simmons and Lauwers JJ.A.]
M. L. Solman and M.Valitutti, for the applicants
G. M. Stuart, for the respondent, The Law Society of Upper Canada
S. Hanley and H. Pitcher, for the respondent, Attorney General for Ontario
Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Solicitor-Client Privilege, Law Society of Upper Canada, Law Society Act, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Facts:
The appellant lawyers and law firm appeal the judgment dismissing their application for:
- an order protecting the confidentiality of solicitor-client privileged information of its clients who have lodged complaints against them;
- an order declaring that the legislative scheme in the Law Society Act related to the Law Society of Upper Canada's investigation powers violated the ss. 7 and 8 Charter rights of these clients/complainants; and
- an order granting the appellants public interest standing to make the Charter arguments on behalf of all clients/complainants in Ontario, if necessary.
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
The appellants assert that in Canada (National Revenue) v. Thompson, the Supreme Court articulated a clear directive to the courts to "facilitate" the requirement to ensure that the client is given the opportunity to protect his or her own solicitor-client privilege and that, therefore, an application directly to the superior court is the proper route for raising this issue. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the appellants' assertion and stated that nothing in the Thompson decision suggested that the court should determine the merits of their Charter challenge and order a remedy before the applicants have exhausted their remedies under the administrative/regulatory proceeding before the Law Society.
Northern Industrial Services Group Inc. v. Duguay, 2016 ONCA 539
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A]
Counsel:
B. Yu, for the appellant
S. A. Carlesso, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Non-Competition Covenants, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment
Facts:
In 2013, the respondent and appellant entered into a share purchase agreement which included a non-competition agreement stipulating that for a period of four years, the respondent would not directly or indirectly engage in or aid, assist or abet others in engaging in any business, conduct or activity in competition with the appellant. In 2013 the respondent's son began a rival enterprise. The appellants brought a claim against the respondent for breach of the non-competition clause. They alleged that by funding his son, the respondent was in breach of their share purchase agreement. The respondent brought a counter-claim for money owning on the share purchase agreement.
The motion judge dismissed the appellant's claim against the respondent and granted the respondent's counterclaim. The appellant appeals the dismissal of its claim on the grounds that the motion judge misapprehended the test for granting summary judgment and made unsupported factual findings.
Issues:
(1) Did the motion judge misapprehend the test for granting summary judgment?
(2) Did the motion judge make erroneous factual findings?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) No. The motion judge correctly set out the roadmap discussed in Hryniak v. Mauldin regarding the granting of summary judgment. His reasons confirm that he understood the legal test for summary judgment and applied it to the facts as he found them.
(2) No. The motion judge did not make erroneous findings of fact. His critical factual findings were amply supported by the evidentiary record. Having found that certain of the evidence relied on by the appellant to prove breach of contract was ambiguous or inconclusive, the motion judge was not obliged to undertake detailed credibility assessments or to resolve the ambiguities in question. Most telling is that the appellant admitted he had no firm facts but only rumours to support the claim. Suspicions alone cannot establish breach of contract.
Anderson v McWatt, 2016 ONCA 553
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
G. Joseph and R. Kniznik, for the appellant
P. D. Schmidt, G. Karahotzitis and M. A. Larock, for the respondent
Keywords: Family Law, Joint Business Venture, Unjust Enrichment, Constructive Trust, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, Real Property Limitations Act, Retroactive Spousal Support, Net Family Property, Equalization
Facts:
The parties together created a successful business and acquired various properties. The appellant husband owned 55% of this business and the respondent wife 45%. The business was run out of a property (the "Atlantic Property"). The Atlantic Property was purchased by the appellant prior to their marriage in his name alone, the plan was to transfer it to a corporate entity to be owned by the husband and wife in accordance with their proportionate ownership of the business, but unbeknownst to the respondent, this transfer never took place and title to the Atlantic Property remainined in the name of the husband. The parties together contributed to renovations and maintenance of the Atlantic Property. After the parties' separation in 2000, the respondent wife stopped going to work at the Atlantic Property. In 2012, the respondent amended her application to include a claim to the Atlantic Property. The respondent claimed unjust enrichment and sought a constructive trust. The trial judge awarded at 45% interest in the Atlantic Property to the respondent, retroactive spousal support from 2000-2015, and prejudgment interest on the equalization payment.
Issues:
Did the judge err in any of the following awards?
(1) The constructive trust, specifically
(a) Is the claim barred by the Real Property Limitations Act?
(b) Was the 45% apportionment correct?
(c) Should a monetary award have been awarded instead?
(2) The retroactive spousal support from 2000-2015
(3) Prejudgment interest on the equalization payment
Holding: Appeal Dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) No.
(a) No. The respondent did not discover that the Atlantic Property was no longer held by the corporation until 2012 and therefore her claim to the property was no statute-barred. Although the respondent was aware that she may have a claim to the property, the appellant's financial statements indicated that the Atlantic Property was owned by the corporation, and she was permitted to rely on this evidence.
(b) Yes. The judge accepted evidence that the respondent thought the property would be jointly owned, the parties maintained it together. There was no error.
(c) No. The trial judge reviewed the evidence, considered the appropriateness of a monetary award and rejected it. She correctly considered the difficulty of recovery, the contributions made by the respondent, the market forces that increased the value of the property, and the profits that the appellant had taken for himself.
(2) No. The trial judge found that the respondent assumed primary responsibility for the household and the children during the marriage and after separation, contributed equally to the success of the joint business, suffered undue economic hardship from the marriage breakdown, made valiant efforts at self-sufficiency after the marriage but was unable to attain her marital standard of living, suffered economic disadvantage to the advantage of the appellant, and suffered emotional abuse at the hands of the appellant. The award was justified.
(3) The judge ruled that the equalization payment was due and payable to the respondent in 1997 and that there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the payor is required to pay prejudgment interest on an equalization payment at the judge's discretion. There is no reason to interfere with this decision.
Babington-Browne v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 549
[Laskin, Tulloch and Hourigan J.J.A.]
Counsel:
T. Burke, for the appellants
H. Robertson and S. Goudarzi, for the respondents
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Crown Liability, Jurisdiction, Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, Section 21(1), Real and Substantial Connection, Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda
Facts:
In July 2009, Captain Babington-Browne, a British soldier, was killed in a Canadian Forces helicopter crash in Afghanistan. He had been deployed there for a coalition mission directed by Canada's Department of National Defence and coordinated by NATO. His mother and brother brought an action in negligence against the federal Crown, the pilot and the flight engineer who operated the helicopter on the day of the crash. The motion judge at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice struck the claim against the federal Crown on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. Under s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act (the "CLPA"), the Ontario Superior Court would have jurisdiction only if the claim against the federal Crown arose in Ontario.
Issues:
Whether the motion judge erred in the interpretation and application of s. 21(1) of the CLPA, specifically:
(1) Whether the motion judge erred in failing to apply the test for jurisdiction established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda ("Van Breda").
(2) Whether the Ontario Superior Court has jurisdiction over the claim against the federal Crown.
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) No. Section 21(1) of the CLPA states: "In all cases where a claim is made against the Crown, except where the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to it, the superior court of the province in which the claim arises has concurrent jurisdiction with respect to the subject-matter of the claim." Under s. 21(1) a provincial superior court will only have jurisdiction over claims against the federal crown if the claim arose in its province.
In Van Breda, the Supreme Court of Canada established that plaintiffs must show a real and substantial connection between the subject matter of their claim and the province in which they seek to litigate that claim. There are four presumptive connecting factors:
– the defendant is domiciled or resident in the province;
– the defendent carries on business in the province;
– the tort was committed in the province; and
– a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province.
In Van Breda itself, Lebel J. noted that the test is subject to the provisions of specific statutes. Section 21(1) of the CLPA is a specific statutory provision that sets out a different test from that in Van Breda. Therefore, the words of s. 21(1) should be applied rather than Van Breda. The application of the real and substantial connection test to the federal Crown would lead to impractical results that do not take account of the language of the CLPA.
(2) No. The proper approach to deciding whether a provincial superior court has jurisdiction over a claim against the federal Crown is set out in David S. LaFlamme as follows: "the court is required to examine the facts surrounding the claim in the light of the elements of the alleged cause of action in order to decide where the substance of the claim arose." The focus on the "substance of the claim" means that, in a tort action, a province's superior court will not necessarily have jurisdiction over the claim simply because one of the alleged acts of negligence or one of the underlying facts took place in that province.
The Court finds no doubt that the substance of the appellant's claim against the federal Crown arose in Afghanistan and not in Ontario. The bulk of the alleged negligent acts that caused the helicopter crash took place in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Ontario Superior Court does not have jurisdiction.
Seto v. Peel Condominium Corporation No. 492, 2016 ONCA 548
[Sharpe, Lauwers and Miller JJ.A.]
Counsel:
C.A. Dirks, for the appellant
B. Chaplick, for the respondents
Keywords: Endorsement, Real Estate, Condominiums, Declarations, Interpretation, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp
Facts:
A condominium building had a food court with several adjacent residential units. At issue was the application judge's reconciliation of contradictory provisions in the condominium's declaration. The application judge ruled that the condominium's declaration required costs arising from the disposal of waste from the food court to be paid as a common expense by all owners instead of solely by the food court vendors.
Issues:
(1) Did the application judge err in his ruling on who should bear the costs of waste disposal?
(2) Did the application judge incorrectly excuse the food court unit owners from paying for the disposal of their own individual waste at their own cost?
Holding: Appeal allowed in part.
Reasoning:
(1) No. The application judge's ruling was one of mixed fact and law that attracts deference on appeal. The application judge made no overriding error when reaching his conclusion. The appellant argued that the application judge erred in law by failing to consider the past practice of charging waste disposal fees directly to the food court unit owners. The application judge did refer to the past practice when he rejected the submission that the respondents had lost the right to complain of the charges through acquiescence.
(2) Yes. The judge made a clear error in this part of his ruling. The determination of the correct amount is remitted back to the application judge if it cannot be settled by the parties.
Ur-Rahman v. Mahatoo, 2016 ONCA 555
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
W. Greenspoon-Soer and M. Unger-Peters, for the appellants
N. Misir and K. Singh, for the respondent
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Default Judgments, Setting Aside, Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen
Facts:
The appellants appeal from the order of Dow J. of the Superior Court of Justice, dismissing their motion for an order setting aside the default judgment of Herman J. of the Superior Court, and the damages judgment of Firestone J. of the Superior Court, and associated relief. The appellants claim that they first learned of the default judgment (and the respondent's entire action) in mid-May 2015, when they received notice from the Sheriff's office that a judgment against them was to be enforced against their property. They then sought legal advice and, in June 2015, moved for relief in the Superior Court to permit them to defend the action on the merits. Before this court, the appellants acknowledged that the motion judge correctly identified the factors governing the determination whether to set aside a default judgment. However, they argued that he erred in his application of those factors by misapprehending the evidence relating to each.
Specifically, the appellants submitted that the motion judge erred by holding that:
i) they did not act promptly after learning of the default judgment;
ii) they did not have a plausible excuse or explanation for their default in complying with the Rules of Civil Procedure;
iii) they failed to raise a meritorious defence; and
iv) granting the motion would offend the overall integrity of the administration of justice.
Issues:
(1) Did the motion judge err by misapprehending the evidence relating to the test for setting aside a default judgment?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) No. The court was not persuaded by the appellant's submissions. The court found no reversible error in the motion judge's discretionary decision refusing to set aside the default judgment or in his application of the governing test to the facts of this case.
The motion judge correctly referred to this court's decision in Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194, 119 O.R. (3d) 561, and the factors identified in that case, at paras. 47-51, as governing whether to set aside a default judgment. He considered the relevant factors in light of the evidence and found that there was an unacceptable and inadequately explained delay by the appellants which frustrated the normal litigation process.
SHORT CIVIL ENDORSEMENTS
Collins v. Ontario, 2016 ONCA 538
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
R. M. Collins, acting in person
A. Laldin, for the responding party Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada
D. Mayer, for the responding party Attorney General of Ontario
Keywords: Endorsement, Appellate Jurisdiction, Issuance of Originating Process
Mackey v. Rerrie, 2016 ONCA 541
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
S. Benmor, for the appellant
P. C. Buttigieg, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Family Law, Uncontested Order, Financial Disclosure
Maasland v. Toronto (City), 2016 ONCA 551
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
S. Clark and A. Esonwanne, for the appellant
B. Weintraub, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Employment Law, Wrongful Dismissal, Constructive Dismissal, Mitigation
Roberts v. Wong, 2016 ONCA 540
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
O. B. Vincents, for the appellant
B. Walker-Renshaw, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Consent and Capacity Board, Capacity to Consent to Treatment, Fresh Evidence, Mootness, Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General)
Madhai v. Cox, 2016 ONCA 547
[MacPherson, Simmons and Lauwers JJ.A.]
Counsel:
No one appearing for the appellants
J. Reid, for the respondents Entesham A.R. Ahmed and Mohammed S. Ahmed
A. Choi, for the respondent Minister of Finance
Keywords: Endorsement, Appeal Abandoned
Ontario Review Board Decisions
Coburn (Re), 2016 ONCA 536
[Watt, Epstein and van Rensburg JJ.A.]
Counsel:
D. F. Moore, for the appellant
K. Hunt, for the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health
C. Elmasry, for the Attorney General of Ontario
Keywords: Endorsement, Ontario Review Board, Criminal Law, Not Criminally Responsible, Conditional Discharge, Significant Threat, Schizophrenia, Incapable of Consenting to Treatment, Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute)
CRIMINAL LAW DECISIONS
R. v. Ellis, 2016 ONCA 529
[Simmons, van Rensburg and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
B. Vandebeek, for the appellant
J. Smith Joy, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Firearms Offences, Sentencing, Victim Fine Surcharge
R. v. St. Roch (Publication Ban), 2016 ONCA 530
[Doherty, Feldman and Brown JJ.A.]
Counsel:
J. Di Luca, for the appellant
J. Smith Joy, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Defences, Honest but Mistaken Belief in Consent, Air of Reality
R. v. DaFonte, 2016 ONCA 532
[Doherty, Feldman and Brown JJ.A.]
Counsel:
T. E. Breen, for the appellant
J. McInnes, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Criminal Contempt of Court, R v. Glasner, Sentencing, Absolute Discharge, Practice Mentoring
R. v. Bonilla-Perez, 2016 ONCA 535
[Pepall, Tulloch and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
P. Campbell, for the appellant
D. Bonnet, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Firearms Offences, Misapprehension of Evidence, Unreasonable Verdict
R. v. Stacey, 2016 ONCA 537
[Rouleau, Hourigan and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
I. McLean, for the appellant
K. Beaudoin, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Impaired Driving, Summary Conviction, Leave to Appeal
R. v. Tran, 2016 ONCA 534
[Pepall, Tulloch and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
M. M. Fahmy, for the appellant
S. Dawson, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Production of Marijuana, Trafficking in Marijuana, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, s. 20, Post-Forfeiture Relief
R. v. Blondin, 2016 ONCA 557
[MacFarland, Rouleau and Hourigan JJ.A.]
Counsel:
E. Granger, for the appellant
M. Rahman, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Evidence, Self-Defence
R. v. Bools (Publication Ban), 2016 ONCA 554
[Rouleau, Hourigan and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
J. McCulligh, for the appellant
L. Henderson, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Possession of Child Pornography, Creation of Child Pornography, Accessing Child Pornography, Evidence, Statements Made After Arrest, Voir Dire
R. v. Jones, 2016 ONCA 543
[MacPherson, MacFarland and LaForme JJ.A.]
Counsel:
P. McCann, for the appellant
R. Schwartz, for the respondent Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario
N. Devlin, for the respondent Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada
S. Chapman and N. Greckol-Herlich, for the intervener Criminal Lawyers' Association
Keywords: Criminal Law, Firearms Offences, Drug Trafficking, Evidence, Production Order, Phone Records, Standing, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8, Unreasonable Search or Seizure, Criminal Code, Part VI, Invasion of Privacy
*Note, this appeal was heard together with R. v. Marakah, 2016 ONCA 542 and R. v. Smith, 2016 ONCA 544. The court has released three separate sets of reasons in these appeals.
R. v. Marakah, 2016 ONCA 542
[MacPherson, MacFarland and LaForme JJ.A.]
Counsel:
M. J. Sandler and W. Cunningham, for the appellant
R. Schwartz, for the respondent Her Majesty in Right of Ontario
N. Devlin, for Her Majesty in Right of Canada
S. Chapman and N. Greckol-Herlich, for the intervener Criminal Lawyers' Association
Keywords: Criminal Law, Firearms Offences, Trafficking, Evidence, Standing to Challenge a Search or Seizure, Expectation of Privacy, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8, Unreasonable Search or Seizure, s. 24(2), Exclusion of Evidence
*Note, this appeal was heard together with R. v. Jones, 2016 ONCA 543 and R. v. Smith, 2016 ONCA 544. The court has released three separate sets of reasons in these appeals.
R. v. Smith, 2016 ONCA 544
[MacPherson, MacFarland and LaForme JJ.A]
Counsel:
M. Davies and M. McMahon, for the appellant
R. Schwartz, for the respondent Her Majesty in Right of Ontario
N. Devlin, for the respondent Her Majesty in Right of Canada
S. Chapman and N. Greckol-Herlich, for the intervener Criminal Lawyers' Association
Keywords: Criminal Law, Firearms Offences, Drug Trafficking, Sentencing, Other Known Person, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8, Unreasonable Search or Seizure
*Note, this appeal was heard together with R. v. Marakah, 2016 ONCA 542 and R. v. Jones, 2016 ONCA 543. The court has released three separate sets of reasons in these appeals.
R. v. Louangrath, 2016 ONCA 550
[Cronk, Juriansz and Tulloch JJ.A.]
Counsel:
S. Walker, for the appellant
A. Baiasu, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Assault, Forcible Seizure, Sentencing, Evidence, Hearsay, Reliability
R. v. Wright, 2016 ONCA 546
[Weiler, Simmons and Epstein JJ.A.]
Counsel:
M. C. Halfyard and B. Vandebeek, for the appellant
G. Skerkowski, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Manslaughter, Jury Instructions, Self-Defence, Expert Evidence
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
