Civil Decisions
116 Ontario Limited v. 833960 Ontario Limited (M-Plan Consulting), 2017 ONCA 854
[Laskin, Lauwers and Brown JJ.A.]
Counsel:
G. Slaght and P. Healy, for the appellant
S. Zeitz, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Corporations, Shareholder Loans, Guarantees, General Security Agreements, Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. B16, ss. 184(1)
Facts:
The appellant company ("M-Plan") wanted to acquire an ownership interest in the company Danbury Financial. One of the shareholders of Danbury Financial was Danbury Sales. In order to acquire an ownership interest in Danbury Financial, M-Plan loaned Danbury Sales $500,000, which Danbury Sales then used to make a shareholder's loan of $750,000 to Danbury Financial. The motion judge found that the $500,000 advanced by M-Plan would be a loan to Danbury Sales until shares in Danbury Financial were delivered to M-Plan and registered on the books of the company. M-Plan never received registered shares in Danbury Financial.
In June 2010, as Danbury Financial was in the midst of financial difficulties, Danbury Sales entered into a Trust Agreement with M-Plan which provided M-Plan with a beneficial interest in a portion of Danbury Sales' shares in Danbury Financial. After this agreement was signed and Danbury Financial had failed, M-Plan began to demand repayment of its loan. In 2013, in exchange for M-Plan's agreement to forbear from suing for recovery of its loan, the respondent (116) agreed to guarantee Danbury Sales' debt to M-Plan and to enter into a General Security Agreement with M-Plan. 116 did not honour its Guarantee. Instead it started an action against M-Plan and brought a motion for summary judgment for a declaration that the Guarantee and the General Security Agreement were unenforceable because the 2010 Trust Agreement had discharged Danbury Sales' debt to M-Plan. In turn, M-Plan started an action to enforce its Guarantee and brought a cross-motion for summary judgment.
The motion judge found that the 2010 Trust Agreement discharged the loan by providing M-Plan with a beneficial interest in shares of Danbury Financial.
Issues:
(1) Did the motion judge err in holding that the 2010 Trust Agreement discharged M-Plan's $500,000 loan to Danbury Sales?
(2) Did the motion judge err in determining, in the alternative, that the Guarantee and General Security Agreement of 116 were enforceable regardless of the respondent's argument that they are not enforceable because the shareholders of 116 did not consent to those agreements being made?
(3) Did the motion judge commit a palpable and overriding error in finding that Danbury Financial mistakenly paid M-Plan $130,000 to reduce Danbury Sales' indebtedness to M-Plan?
Holding:
Appeal allowed.
Reasoning:
(1) Yes. The motion judge's conclusion that the 2010 Trust Agreement discharged M-Plan's loan was unreasonable.
It was unreasonable for three main reasons. First, the motion judge's conclusion contradicted his finding of fact. The motion judge found that M-Plan's $500,000 loan to Danbury Sales could only be discharged by issuing to M-Plan registered shares in Danbury Financial. Contrary to this, the motion judge concluded that M-Plan's beneficial interest in 22 shares of Danbury Financial, which was acknowledged in the 2010 Trust Agreement, discharged M-Plans' loan. The motion judge's finding of fact on the consideration for the loan and his conclusion on the effect of the 2010 Trust Agreement cannot stand together. M-Plan did not get what it paid for when it received a beneficial interest in the shares of Danbury Financial. It was entitled to a legal interest – registered shares, without which it was denied the most fundamental right of share ownership – the right to vote the shares.
Second, in concluding that the 2010 Trust Agreement had the effect of discharging M-Plan's loan to Danbury Sales, the motion judge did not take account of the agreement as a whole or the context in which it was made. In concluding that the agreement was a "genuine conveyance of an ownership interest" in the shares, the motion judge only focussed on two terms of the agreement: the term providing that Danbury Sales held 22 of its shares in Danbury Financial as a bare trustee for M-Plan; and the term providing that on a direction from M-Plan, Danbury Sales would be required to transfer the shares. However, it is evident from the 2010 Trust Agreement and the context that the agreement did not convey ownership of the shares to M-Plan. Its purpose, at most, was to give M-Plan some security for its loan.
Finally, the motion judge's conclusion disregards the conduct and understanding of the parties themselves after they signed the 2010 Trust Agreement. The principal of M-Plan and the principal of Danbury Sales both conducted themselves on the basis that M-Plan's loan was still outstanding. After Danbury Financial had failed, the principal of M-Plan began pressing the principal of Danbury Sales for repayment of the loan, and the principal of Danbury Sales tried to find a way to forestall a lawsuit. This is why he offered a guarantee and other security for the loan in the respondent company. In June 2012, the parties began negotiating a series of agreements, and eventually signed three security documents and a promissory note the following year. All four documents recited that M-Plan's $500,000 loan was still outstanding.
(2) No. Subsection 184(1) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act stipulates that a director of a corporation can give a Guarantee and a General Security Agreement on behalf of a corporation without shareholder authorization unless the articles, bylaws, or a unanimous shareholder agreement of the corporation provide otherwise. 116 did not have a shareholder agreement, and nothing in its articles or by-laws prevented a director from giving security without shareholder approval. To the contrary, the corporation's general By-Law No. 2 allowed the directors to commit the corporation to guaranteeing the repayment of debts.
Section 19 of the Business Corporations Act entitled M-Plan to assume that the principal of 116, who was also the principal of Danbury Sales, was authorized to give the Guarantee and General Security Agreement on behalf of 116 unless M-Plan or its principal knew otherwise. The motion judge found that he did not. This finding was reasonably available to the motion judge and it is not tainted by any palpable or overriding error.
(3) Yes. The timing and the size of the payments correspond to payments that a related company, Danbury Industrial, made to reduce its debt to M-Plan on a different transaction. Also, the three payments were made well before the Guarantee and General Security Agreement were given. If the parties intended that the payments were made to reduce Danbury Sales' debt to M-Plan, then these documents would have stated that only $370,000 was owing on M-Plan's loan to Danbury Sales.
Bois v. MD Physician Services Inc., 2017 ONCA 857
[Simmons, Rouleau and Brown JJ.A.]
Counsel:
M Rowe, for the appellant
A L Barber, for the respondents
Keywords: Employment Law, Contracts, Bonuses, Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, ss 11(5) and 13(1), Kielb v. National Money Mart Company, 2017 ONCA 356
Facts:
The Appellant, Mark Bois, worked for the Respondents from August, 1997 until his resignation in October, 2011. In 2009 and 2010 the Appellant was awarded bonuses under the Respondent's Variable Incentive Plan ("VIP"). Under the plan, a bonus awarded for a year was payable in equal installments over the three years following the calendar year for which the bonus was awarded. The 2007 VIP stated: "In the event a Participant's continuous Active Employment terminates, either voluntarily or involuntarily and whether for cause or not for cause, the Participant will immediately forfeit any entitlement to any payments under this plan whether attributable to prior years or to the current year." In 2011 the language was replaced with: "Any employee who has left the organization or has given notice to leave the organization on or before the incentive payment date will not be eligible to receive a payment."
On March 16, 2010, the Respondent and the Appellant signed a letter agreeing to the following: "In any given year, you must be a permanent employee of the CMAH Group of Companies on December 31 of the year for which the incentive is paid and continue to be so employed on the payment date(s) to receive a payment. Any employee who is no longer employed with the organization or has given notice of termination prior to the payout date will not be eligible to receive a payment." The appellant resigned before the pay-out dates for the final installment of his 2009 bonus and two installments of his 2010 bonus. The Appellant commenced an action seeking payment of those installments, but the motion judge dismissed the action by way of summary judgment. The Appellant appealed on the ground that the motion judge misinterpreted sections 11(5) and 13 of the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41 ("ESA").
Issues:
(1) Did the Motion Judge err in concluding the "active employment" requirement in the Respondents' VIP, under which the Appellant was awarded a bonus, did not conflict with ss. 11(5) and 13(1) of the ESA?
Holding:
Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
1. No. Section 11(5) of the ESA provides:
11(5) If an employee's employment ends, the employer shall pay any wages to which the employee is entitled to the employee not later than the later of,
(a) seven days after the employment ends; and
(b) the day that would have been the employee's next pay day.
Section 13(1) provides:
13(1) An employer shall not withhold wages payable to an employee, make a deduction from an employee's wages or cause the employee to return his or her wages to the employer unless authorized to do so under this section.
The appellant contends that where a bonus has been awarded for a year, but at the time of the employee's resignation future bonus installments remain to be paid-out, s. 11(5) of the ESA effectively operates to accelerate the employer's obligation to pay-out future installments, notwithstanding language in an incentive plan requiring the employee to be actively employed at the date of any future payouts. To the extent that the terms of the VIP sought to disentitle the appellant to the future installments, they were void, as they contravened s. 13(1) of the ESA. The Court of Appeal did not agree. The motion judge construed s. 11(5) of the ESA as requiring the respondents to determine whether, at the time the Appellant's employment ended, he was entitled to the payment of any bonus installments based on the wording of the VIP and the length of his notice period. The motion judge concluded that the Respondents correctly determined that the Appellant's entitlements were extinguished by virtue of his resignation. In accordance with the decision in Kielb v. National Money Mart Company, 2017 ONCA 356, it was open to the parties to agree how and when any bonus was declared, earned, accrued and would be payable. A plan's requirement that the employee be actively employed at the time of a future pay-out does not contravene s. 11(5) of the ESA, nor does such an active employment provision contravene s. 13(1) of the ESA, as the future pay-outs do not constitute "wages payable to an employee" at the time of his resignation.
Latner Estate v. Latner, 2017 ONCA 859
[Sharpe, Rouleau and Fairburn JJ.A.]
Counsel:
David Chernos and Andrew Finkelstein, for the appellants/respondents by way of cross-appeal
Ronald B. Moldaver, Q.C., for the respondents/appellants by way of cross-appeal
Keywords: Estates Law, Family Law, Family Agreement, Preceding Oral Agreement, Gift
Facts:
On February 22, 2007, the late Albert Latner, his four children and various related corporations entered into an agreement by which Albert relinquished control over his companies. In exchange, the children and their respective corporations agreed to make certain payments to Albert (the "Latner Family Agreement"). Albert brought claims against his son Joshua seeking payment of the sums owed to him pursuant to the Latner Family Agreement. The claims also sought repayment of a $13 million payment Albert made to Joshua in April 2007. Prior to trial, Albert passed away and the claims were continued by his estate.
Joshua maintains that nothing was owed by him pursuant to the Latner Family Agreement because he had reached an oral agreement with Albert that did not require the payments stipulated in the Latner Family Agreement to be made. Albert also gave Joshua a $1 million promissory note as part of the oral agreement. As for the claim for the return of the $13 million payment, Joshua maintains that it was a gift that was properly documented and that there is no basis for requiring it to be returned.
At trial, the judge agreed with Joshua that the $13 million was a gift and he rejected the claim for its return. However, the trial judge determined that the alleged oral agreement to the effect that Joshua would not be required to make the payments provided for in the Latner Family Agreement was unenforceable. He also found that the $1 million promissory note could not be set off against the sums found to be owing under the Latner Family Agreement because it was part of the unenforceable oral agreement.
The trial judge found that the oral agreement was entered into before the Latner Family Agreement was concluded and was counter to ss. 1.2 and 9.6 of that agreement. Section 1.2 provided that the Latner Family Agreement constituted the entire agreement among the parties and superseded all other prior agreements, whether written or oral, among the parties. Section 9.6 stated that no supplement, modification, waiver or termination of the Latner Family Agreement would be binding unless executed in writing by all the parties. As a result, the trial judge found Joshua liable under the Latner Family Agreement and gave judgment in the amount of $2,776,895. Joshua appealed the finding of liability against him. Albert's Estate cross-appealed the dismissal of its claim for the return of the $13 million payment.
Joshua argues that a legally binding oral agreement was not reached until April 2007, some two months after the Latner Family Agreement was entered into and that the court ought to have found the oral agreement to be enforceable despite the exclusionary clauses in the Latner Family Agreement. On the cross-appeal, Albert's Estate argues that because the $13 million was a gift to one of Albert's children, there is a presumption of a resulting trust in favour of Albert and that the record is insufficient to rebut the presumption.
Issues:
1. Did the trial judge err in finding that the oral agreement was made before the Latner Family Agreement was signed?
2. Is the record insufficient to rebut the presumption that the $13 million resulted in a trust in favour of Albert?
Holding: Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
1. No. The Court saw no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion that the oral agreement between Albert and Joshua was entered into before the parties concluded the Latner Family Agreement, as it is fully supported by the record. The further steps taken in April 2007, do not alter the fact that the agreement Joshua sought to enforce was reached before the Latner Family Agreement was entered into. By its terms, the Latner Family Agreement terminated any prior written or oral agreement.
2. No. There was ample support for the trial judge's finding that the $13 million was a gift and that any presumption to the contrary had been rebutted. The gift was fully documented and Albert's intention that it be a gift was confirmed by testimony of witnesses independent of Joshua. Proof of Albert's reason for making the gift is not required.
McCabe (Canadian Commercial Flooring) v. Finn Way General Contractor Inc., 2017 ONCA 867
[Watt, Pepall and Miller JJ.A.]
Keywords: Construction Law, Breach of Contract, Damages, Orders, Amending or Varying, Accidental Slip or Omission, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59.01(6), Costs
Counsel:
Roderick W. Johansen, for the appellant/respondent by way of cross-appeal
Hugh N. MacDonald, for the respondent/appellant by way of cross-appeal
Facts:
The respondent, Dan McCabe, contracted with the appellant, Finn Way General Contractor Inc., to install sheet vinyl flooring at a long-term care facility. After a dispute with the respondent, the appellant hired another contractor to complete the job. The respondent brought an action against the appellant for monies owing under the balance of the contract, and for extra work and materials not covered by the contract. The appellant counterclaimed for money it expended to hire the additional subcontractor, and for additional materials and expenses. The contract was part of a larger renovation project for which the appellant was the general contractor. The trial judge found that the respondent advised the appellant that deficiencies in the sub-floor structure prevented him from properly installing the vinyl flooring, and that he needed the appellant to rectify the deficiencies. The appellant refused the respondent's demand that the appellant open up the flooring and resolve the issue, and instead directed the respondent to attempt a "quick and dirty" fix by securing the sub-floor with additional screws, and to continue laying the flooring. The attempted fix was unsuccessful, and the project architect required the vinyl flooring to be removed and replaced. The respondent was unwilling to do this unless paid for the previous work and relieved of his warranty obligations, as the failure of the vinyl flooring was not due to his workmanship but to the condition of the sub-floor. The appellant refused and instead hired another subcontractor to finish laying the vinyl flooring.
The respondent sued for breach of contract. The appellant counterclaimed, arguing that the respondent abandoned the job. It argued that the flooring installation problems were entirely due to the respondent's poor execution, as the second contractor succeeded in properly installing the vinyl flooring. The trial judge rejected the appellant's submission; found that defects in the vinyl flooring remained, and that these were attributable to the defective sub-floor. The trial judge awarded the respondent damages for breach of contract and dismissed the counterclaim. The appellant appealed the finding of liability. The respondent cross-appealed on the calculation of damages.
Issues:
(1) Did the trial judge err in finding the respondent was unable to install the vinyl flooring because of defects in the subfloor, and that it was the appellant's responsibility to remedy the defects in the subfloor?
(2) Did the trial judge err in awarding costs?
(3) Did the trial judge err in assessing damages?
Held: Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal allowed.
Reasoning:
(1) No. There was no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's decision. The trial judge considered the evidence, made specific findings as to the credibility of the appellant's sole witness, made specific findings of fact, and drew permissible inferences from those findings. It was not open to the court to re-weigh the evidence or draw different inferences.
(2) No. The fact that the appellant received a lower costs award in an action it brought against another contractor had no bearing on what constitutes an appropriate costs award. The court also rejected the argument that the award ought to have been reduced to reflect the fact that the respondent was not awarded the full quantum of damages sought.
(3) Yes. The respondent's cross-appeal was brought with respect to the trial judge's decision that he had no authority under rule 59.06(1), after his reasons had been issued, to correct what he acknowledged to be a technical error. The trial judge inadvertently used an incorrect figure in his calculations of damages. This was an accidental slip and the trial judge might have corrected this error under rule 59.06(1). The error in the damages amount of the judgment was varied from $49,451.44 to $61,547.33. The cross-appeal was therefore allowed.
United States v. Norton, 2017 ONCA 866
[Simmons, van Rensburg and Nordheimer JJ.A.]
Counsel:
G S Campbell & K G Kernisant, for the applicant
R A Kramer, for the Attorney General of Canada
Keywords: Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Ministerial Decision, Standard of Review, Reasonableness, Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, Extradition Law, Extradition Act, Criminal Law, Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, Aboriginal Defendants, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 6-7, United States of America v. Leonard, 2012 ONCA 622, R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688
Facts:
On March 26, 2010, Mr. Norton (the applicant) was immediately arrested after delivering 80 pounds of marijuana to an undercover officer at a hotel in New Jersey. Mr. Norton was indicted by a grand jury on September 30, 2010. He is now 54 years old and has three children (aged 26, 16, and 6). He was born in the United States and is a Mohawk of Akwesasne. He is registered as an Indian under the Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5 and is officially recognized as a member of the Mohawks of Akwesasne. He has familial and cultural roots throughout the Akwesasne territory, which overlaps Ontario, Quebec and New York State.
On March 21, 2011, he attended court with counsel and signed a voluntary plea agreement with the prosecutor in which he admitted to the essential elements of the offence. The plea agreement stipulated that Mr. Norton would serve a term of eight years in custody in a New Jersey Correctional facility in exchange for his admission of guilt. Mr. Norton was ordered to appear in court for sentencing on June 24, 2011. The sentencing was adjourned on consent on a number of occasions. It was finally set for March 23, 2012. On March 23, 2012, Mr. Norton failed to appear in court. The matter was adjourned to March 30, 2012, at which point Mr. Norton again failed to appear and a warrant was issued for his arrest.
On September 16, 2015, at the request of the United States, Mr. Norton was provisionally arrested, pursuant to s. 13 of the Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18. On May 26, 2016, a judge of the Superior Court of Justice found that there was sufficient evidence to commit Mr. Norton on trafficking in a controlled substance as set out in the Authority to Proceed. Mr. Norton was ordered into custody to await the Minister's decision on surrender pursuant to the Extradition Act. Mr. Norton did not appeal the decision of the extradition judge. Submissions were made on behalf of Mr. Norton to the Minister regarding her decision on surrender on October 13, 2016, January 10, 2017 and January 11, 2017. In particular, Mr. Norton submitted that his surrender should be denied based on his personal circumstances, including his Aboriginal heritage under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and under s. 6(1) of the Charter. On February 9, 2017, the Minister gave detailed reasons for her decision to surrender Mr. Norton to the authorities of the United States of America.
The applicant seeks judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Justice dated February 9, 2017, that ordered his surrender to the authorities of the United States of America. The applicant seeks to have that order quashed or, in the alternative, have the matter remitted back to the Minister for reconsideration.
Issues:
(1) Did the Minister fail to give proper consideration to the principles set out in the court's decision in United States of America v. Leonard, 2012 ONCA 622, 112 O.R. (3d) 496 and the principles established in R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, or breach the applicant's Charter rights?
Holding: Application dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) No. The Minister did not fail to properly apply the Leonard decision. In her lengthy and detailed reasons responding to the applicant's submissions, she canvassed all of the relevant factors. She specifically reviewed the reasons in Leonard and applied the principles articulated in that case, taking Mr. Norton's Gladue factors into special consideration both in assessing whether his surrender would violate the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter, and in determining whether extradition was a justifiable limitation of his s. 6(1) Charter rights.
Recognizing that an individual assessment was required, the Minister nevertheless responded to the applicant's arguments that his circumstances were similar to those of Mr. Leonard and Mr. Gionet (whose surrender was also at issue in the Leonard case), and warranted the same result. She pointed out, correctly in the court's view, that there were significant differences between the individual circumstances of Mr. Leonard and Mr. Gionet, on the one hand, and the applicant on the other.
The Minister also expressly considered the factors identified in Gladue. The Minister noted that the applicant's Aboriginal background, along with his other personal circumstances, would be considered at the time of sentencing. She also noted that his Aboriginal background would be considered and accommodated while he was incarcerated in New Jersey. In addition, the Minister had other matters that she had to take into account in reaching her decision on surrender, including Canada's international treaty obligations.
The court must accord substantial deference to the Minister's decision. The standard of review is reasonableness. Unlike the situation in Leonard, apart from claiming that the Minister failed to give proper consideration to Gladue principles, the appellant did not assert any discrete legal error in the Minister's decision. In light of the considerations outlined in the Minister's reasons, the applicant failed to establish that the Minister's decision does not fall "within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law": Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47.
Clark v. 1682211 Ontario Inc. (Sports Café Champions), 2017 ONCA 851
[Sharpe, Rouleau and Fairburn JJ.A.]
Counsel:
David Clark, acting in person
John Philpott, for the respondent
Keywords: Procedural Law, Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 2.1, Appeal Dismissed
Freire v. Freire, 2017 ONCA 853
[Sharpe, Rouleau and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Murray E. Lightman, for the appellant
Philip Viater, for the respondent
Keywords: Family Law, Equalization, Net Family Property, Cohabitation, Separation Agreement, Family Law Act s. 2(8)(a), Appeal Dismissed
Sorbam Investments Ltd. v. Litwack, 2017 ONCA 850
[Sharpe, Rouleau and Fairburn JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Michael Hebert, for the appellant
Tamara Farber, for the respodents
Keywords: Summary Judgment, Nuisance, Negligence, Appeal Dismissed
[MacFarland, Pepall and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Michael F. Blair, acting in person
Michael Kril-Mascarin, for the respondent
Keywords: Garnishment, Retirement Compensation Arrangement, Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8, Wages Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W.1, Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Act, S.O. 1996, c. 31, Appeal Dismissed
Lawyers' Professional Indemnity Company v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 2017 ONCA 858
[Sharpe, Rouleau and Fairburn JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Stephen Cavanagh, for the appellant/respondent by way of cross-appeal
Heather Gray, for the respondent/appellant by way of cross-appeal
Keywords: Insurance Law, Professional Errors and Omissions Insurance, Lawyers, Excess Policy, Appeal Dismissed
H.A.G. v. Family and Children's Services Niagara, 2017 ONCA 861 DATE: 20171109
[Sharpe, Rouleau and Fairburn JJ.A.]
Counsel:
H.A.G., acting in person
Carole Jenkins, for the respondents
Keywords: Torts, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering, Negligence, Damages, Punitive Damages, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(b), Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., 2007 SCC 38, Appeal Dismissed
Criminal and Review Board Decisions
[Laskin, Feldman and Blair JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Paul Alexander, for the appellant
Brendan Gluckman, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Trafficking, Possession, Appeal Allowed
[Simmons, van Rensburg and Nordheimer JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Colin Wood, for the appellant
Tanit Gilliam, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Drug Offences, Search Warrant, Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8, Appeal Dismissed
[Simmons, van Rensburg and Nordheimer JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Margaret Bojanowska, for the appellant
Milica Potrebic, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Circumstantial Evidence, Search Warrant, Exigent Circumstances, Appeal Dismissed
[Laskin, Feldman and Blair JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Eric Granger, for the appellant
Andrew Hotke, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Criminal Harassment, Actus Reus, Appeal Dismissed
[Hoy A.C.J.O., Simmons and Brown JJ.A.]
Counsel:
C.B., appearing in person
Howard Krongold, as duty counsel
Michael Bernstein, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Interference, Sexual Assault, Misapprehension of Evidence, Appeal Allowed
[Doherty, LaForme and Paciocco JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Andrew Hotke, for the appellant
Patrick J. Ducharme, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Impaired Driving, Driving Over 80, Appeal Allowed in Part
[Strathy C.J.O., Doherty J.A. and McCombs J. (ad hoc)]
Howard L. Krongold, for the appellant
Jennifer McKee, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Burden of Proof, Appeal Dismissed
[Simmons, van Rensburg and Nordheimer JJ.A.]
Charles Shortt, for the appellant
Rebecca Schwartz, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Impaired Driving, Appeal Dismissed
[Watt, Brown and Roberts JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Daniel Medd, for the appellant Kenneth Colaco
Karen Shai, for the Ministry of the Attorney General
Michele Warner, for Centre for Addiction and Mental Health
Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Supervision, Appeal Dismissed
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