- Sotheby's largest shareholder launched a proxy contest, challenged Sotheby's recently adopted rights plan and sought to enjoin Sotheby's annual meeting.
- While the court denied injunctive relief, the activist shareholder and Sotheby's settled on the eve of the annual meeting, giving the activist the three board seats it originally sought.
- Shareholder's litigation strategy was successful—even without winning.
- Directors' emails—produced in the litigation—gave the activist the leverage it needed to win board representation.
Last week, the Delaware Chancery Court refused to grant an
activist investor's motion to enjoin Sotheby's annual
meeting pending the resolution of the investor's lawsuit
relating to Sotheby's shareholder rights plan, or so-called
"poison pill." The litigation was part of a months-long
activist campaign by a 9.3 percent shareholder to secure board
representation and changes at Sotheby's.
After the investor built its ownership stake, Sotheby's board
adopted a rights plan. The rights issued under the plan would be
triggered if a person or group acquired 10 percent of Sotheby's
shares, except that passive investors (Schedule 13G filers) were
permitted to acquire up to a 20 percent stake. The activist then
launched a proxy contest for the election of three directors to
Sotheby's 12-member board at its 2014 annual meeting.
When Sotheby's refused to waive the rights plan's 10
percent trigger, the activist sued, asking that the court declare
the rights plan unenforceable or require Sotheby's to permit it
to acquire a 20 percent stake. The complaint noted that it was not
seeking control of Sotheby's, but merely seeking to elect a
"short slate" of directors to its board. In addition, the
investor contended that, under the Unocal standard, the
adoption of a rights plan with a lower triggering threshold for
non-passive investors was not a reasonable or proportionate
response to a shareholder who merely wished to purchase additional
shares, conduct a proxy contest, and communicate with other
shareholders.
The court ruled in Sotheby's favor and denied injunctive
relief. While the court ruled only on the issue as to whether a
preliminary injunction was warranted—and not on the issues of
whether Sotheby's directors had breached their fiduciary duties
or whether the rights plan was invalid—the ruling suggests
that directors who adopt a rights plan in the face of activism can
reasonably determine that there is an objectively reasonable and
legally cognizable threat to the company, and that a rights plan is
a reasonable response to that threat.
But this good news on the apparent viability of rights plans in the
presence of activism belies the larger question: Are rights plans
an effective tool in these circumstances?
The decision to adopt a rights plan in the face of activism for a
short slate is a complex and highly nuanced decision. As we know,
rights plans continue to face consistent opposition by proxy
advisory firms and others, who readily control at least 20 percent
to 30 percent of the vote. Further, in our experience, many
activists are loathe to exceed the 10 percent ownership threshold
in the first place because the Section 16(b) short-swing profit
rules place a serious limitation on their ability to exit their
positions within a six-month window. There are numerous additional
considerations as well, but the Sotheby's situation teaches us
that even a rights plan that survives enhanced scrutiny may still
not be an effective remedy for every activism situation.
Although the denial of injunctive relief was a loss, the activist
was ultimately successful in achieving its goals. As part of a
settlement reached on the eve of the annual meeting, Sotheby's
agreed to adjourn its annual meeting until later in May, to expand
its board to 15 members, and to appoint three of the investor's
nominees as directors. In addition, Sotheby's agreed to
terminate the rights plan as of the date of the adjourned meeting
and to permit the investor to acquire up to a 15 percent stake in
Sotheby's while the plan remained in effect. Sotheby's won
victories of its own, as its CEO retained his position, and the
investor withdrew its litigation relating to the rights plan.
Ultimately, the Sotheby's campaign may best serve to
demonstrate how many activist disputes are not won in the
courtroom, but rather solved and settled in the boardroom. Although
this contest settled, it presents some interesting lessons in
dealing with activism. First, the court's opinion cited
numerous emails from both sides that surely weren't drafted
with a view to public disclosure—a reminder that private
communications can be aired publicly, particularly when lawsuits
are filed. Second, it shows that lawsuits can be used effectively
as ammunition in the activism context, especially in the context of
an impending shareholder meeting—whether or not the lawsuit
is a technical success. Third, although the court did not rule on
the validity of the rights plan, some would suggest that the
court's opinion can be read as an endorsement of rights plans
to defend against activist tactics. But perhaps most importantly,
this matter shows once again the remarkable tenacity of activists
in today's market—the investor ultimately won the three
board seats it originally sought, despite Sotheby's apparent
victory in the litigation.
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