Today's oral argument in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on whether New Jersey's partial repeal of its prohibitions on sports betting, repeatedly came around to one question: what does it really mean to "authorize" something? No clear answer was apparent by the end of the argument.
To put the importance of this concept into context, it's important to look at the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act ("PASPA"). That statute makes it unlawful for a governmental entity to "sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact" sports betting. New Jersey's first challenge to PASPA was its constitutionality – that it violated the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it commandeered the legislative power of the state. The courts rejected that challenge, finding that the state was not commandeered because "we do not read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from repealing its ban on sports wagering" and determining "what the exact contours of the prohibition will be."
Against this backdrop, New Jersey repealed its criminal sports betting prohibitions to the extent that they prohibited sports betting at casinos, racetracks, or the sites of former racetracks operational within the last fifteen years. The sports leagues sued, claiming that this partial repeal amounted to an authorization of sports betting at these facilities – which are heavily regulated by the State already.
Today's argument centered around that point- what does it mean to authorize, and is there a distinction between authorizing something and repealing a prohibition on it? The state argued that it was simply following the Third Circuit's prior decision that said that the state was free to set the contours of its prohibition on sports betting. The state also argued that there is a distinction between authorizing something by law and repealing a criminal prohibition on that activity. Former Solicitor General Theodore Olson, on behalf of the state, said that the Court's prior opinion said that to "authorize" requires some affirmative act, but the panel seemed to suggest that that statement was dicta and the precise question of whether authorizing requires an affirmative act was not before the Court at that time.
Interestingly, Judges Rendell and Fuentes observed that of all the things prohibited by PASPA, "regulating" is not one of them. Judge Fuentes suggested that if the state prevails in this case, perhaps the state could still regulate sports betting and be consistent with PASPA, rather than have sports betting operate in an unregulated space.
Former Solicitor General Paul Clement, on behalf of the Leagues, also confronted the question of what it means to authorize, with Judge Rendell pressing him on whether "authorizing" required the implementation of some sort of scheme, or required the state to do more than just repeal a prohibition. The leagues cited to the legislative history of PASPA, saying that Congress was concerned with stopping casino-style sports betting, and that New Jersey's partial repeal does exactly that. The leagues argued that a partial repeal that keeps the vast majority of the statute in place amounts to a state authorization. Judge Fuentes asked how far the repeal had to go in order to comport with PASPA. The leagues argued that the repeal cannot be limited to just a few licensed venues in the state. The leagues suggested that it would be acceptable to repeal the sports betting prohibition to permit wagers under $100, limited to family members or acquaintances. The leagues further suggested that at least half of a statute needs to be repealed in order for it to be a true partial repeal rather than an implicit authorization.
Despite the thorough, spirited argument, it was very difficult to predict which way this decision might go. Each side can probably point to different comments by the panel to suggest leanings, but we won't know the final outcome until the decision comes out – probably in several months.
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