Seyfarth Synopsis: The Fourth Circuit in a case of first impression held that Title IX entitles transgender students to use the bathroom that matches their gender identity. Though that ruling only discusses Title IX, the Court's language and reasoning may have implications for Title VII jurisprudence.
The Fourth Circuit has become the first Federal Circuit to weigh in on bathroom access for transgender students. In G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, Case No. 15-2056 the court deferred to the U.S. Department of Education's guidance that Title IX, which permits segregation of toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of "sex," prohibits restriction of restrooms on the basis of "gender identity" as well as assigned sex. This ruling not only places the Circuit at odds with state "bathroom bills", but also has potential implications for the Circuit's interpretation of Title VII.
In G.G., plaintiff, a transgender boy, was prevented from using the men's restroom at his high school due to a policy enacted by the school board specifically in response to his gender transition. G.G. sued for gender discrimination under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause and requested a preliminary injunction allowing him to use the bathroom aligning with his gender identity. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed G.G.'s Title IX claim holding that Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and not on the basis of other concepts such as gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of G.G.'s Title IX claim. The Court held that Auer deference required the Court to defer to the Department of Education's interpretation of Title IX regulations, which indicated that transgender students could use hygienic facilities (such as restrooms) consistent with their gender identity regardless of the sex assigned at birth. The Court further found the Department of Education's position regarding access to restrooms for transgender individuals consistent with the position of other federal agencies, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
G.G. is an important decision for employers. While the lawsuit arose under Title IX not Title VII, the reasoning of the Court readily applies to Title VII given the similar verbiage of the statutes and the regular practice of courts to look to case law under both statutes. It is expected that Title VII litigants going forward will increasingly cite G.G, to bolster their argument that courts should defer to the EEOC's position that Title VII's prohibition on sex-discrimination encompasses gender identity. Indeed, as we have blogged previously, a case, ACLU v. McCrory, has already been filed challenging North Carolina's "bathroom bill", alleging harm under Titles IX and VII and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
While the reasoning of G.G. is unlikely to be universally adopted by courts analyzing gender identity claims under Title VII or Title IX, the decision adds voice to the growing chorus of support for the argument that claims of gender identity discrimination are actionable under current Federal law. Employers should consult with counsel to evaluate their internal policies, practices and procedures with an eye toward gender identity claims.
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