In a landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled 5-4 that arbitration clauses in employment contracts requiring individual dispute resolution procedures and prohibiting class actions and other collective litigation procedures must be enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court rejected the position taken by the National Labor Relations Board and some private plaintiffs that employees' right to engage in "concerted activities" for their "mutual aid or protection" recognized in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act makes such class and collective action waivers unenforceable. The Court issued its ruling in three consolidated cases: Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, Ernest & Young LLP v. Morris and National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. In the latter case, the Fifth Circuit reversed the NLRB's determination that the employer violated Section 7 by including an individual arbitration clause in its employment contract. In the former two cases, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits respectively adopted the NLRB's position and allowed private plaintiffs to pursue collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act notwithstanding that they had agreed to individual arbitration clauses in their employment contracts.
The Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Gorsuch, began its analysis by noting that arbitration clauses in employment contracts fall squarely within the FAA's command that all arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." The Court then rejected the argument that the final clause of this command, called the "savings clause," implicates Section 7 of the NLRA. The Court explained that the savings clause permits a party to oppose arbitration based on defenses, such as fraud in the inducement or duress, that might apply to "any contract." However, the savings clause does not allow a court to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement based on defenses that specifically target arbitration. The Court reasoned that a putative defense to enforcement of an individual arbitration clause on the theory that such a clause violates employees' right to engage in "concerted activities" under Section 7 is precisely the type of defense that is not preserved by the savings clause because it specifically targets the alleged illegality of such clauses in the employment setting. It is, by definition, not a defense of general applicability.
The Court likewise rejected the argument that there is a "conflict" between the FAA and Section 7 of the NLRA such that Section 7 overrides or impliedly repeals the FAA to the extent the FAA would require enforcement of an individual arbitration clause in an employment contract. The Court held that there could be no conflict between Section 7 and the FAA because "Section 7 doesn't speak to class and collective action procedures" and contains no "hint about what rules should govern the adjudication of class or collective actions in court or arbitration." The Court reasoned that "[u]nion organization and collective bargaining in the workplace are the bread and butter of the NLRA," and it is "more than a little doubtful that Congress would have tucked into the mousehole" of Section 7 "an elephant that tramples the work done by" the FAA and other laws governing "the particulars of dispute resolution procedures in Article III courts or arbitration procedures."
Lastly, the Court rejected the argument that the NLRB's position was entitled to deference under the Chevron doctrine (which requires courts to defer to a federal agency's interpretation of the statute it administers in certain circumstances). The Court explained that Chevron was inapplicable because the NLRB did not confine itself to interpreting NLRA, the statue it administers, but rather "sought to interpret this statute in a way that limits the work of a second statute," the FAA. If an agency's "reconciliation" of allegedly competing statutes were subject to deference under Chevron, then "[a]n agency eager to advance its statutory mission, but without any particular interest in or expertise with a second statute, might (as here) seek to diminish the second statute's scope in favor of a more expansive interpretation of its own," thus "bootstrapping itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction."
The decision is a significant win for employers seeking to limit the costs and risks of class and collective litigation by employees.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Alito joined Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan. The Schnader firm submitted an amicus brief in support of the enforceability of class action waivers in employment contracts in all three cases on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association and several state mortgage lending associations.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
