- Forfeiture means loss or denial of something in case if there is a penalty or fine imposed due to an action or an omission by moving away from one's obligations. In Contract law, it is generally used to indicate that, with former consensus between the parties, the amount which is clearly indicated in terms of the contract to be given as earnest is not given back to the purchaser who has given his money, if due to his fault or failure, the contract is broken in nearby future.
- The question in regard to claim for forfeiture of amount as compensation is to be considered with reference to Sections 73 and / or 74 of the Contract Act.
Section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872 deals with the compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. The same is extracted below: -
"Section 73 Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract:
When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it.
Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.
Compensation for failure to discharge obligation resembling those created by contract.
When an obligation resembling those created by contract has been incurred and has not been discharged, any person injured by the failure to discharge it is entitled to receive the same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract.
Explanation. -In estimating the loss or damage arising from a breach of contract, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract must be taken into account."
- The principles underlying Section 73 are well settled. The classic case dealing with remoteness of damages is Hadley Vs Baxendale, (1843-60) ALL ER Rep 461, wherein it was observed:
"Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be either such as may fairly and reasonably be considered arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have in the contemplation of both parties at the time they make the contract as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both the parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract which they would reasonably contemplate, would be amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under those special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the circumstances been known, the parties might have provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case, thus it would be very unjust to deprive them."
- The above principles were explained and clarified by the Court of Appeal in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. Vs Newman Industrial Ltd., 1949 (1) ALL ER 997, as under: -
"i) it is well settled that the governing purpose of damage is to put the party whose rights have been violated in the same position, so far as money can do it, as if his rights had been observed.
ii) In cases of breach of contract, the aggrieved party is only entitled to recover such part of the loss as actually resulting as was at time of the contract reasonably foreseeable as liable to result from the breach.
iii) What was at that time reasonably to foreseeable depends on the knowledge then possessed by the party who later commits the breach.
iv) For this purpose, knowledge possessed is of two kinds one imputed, the other actual. Everyone, as a reasonable person, is taken to know the ordinary course of thing and consequently what loss is liable to result from a breach of contract in that ordinary course. This is the subject matter of first rule in Hadley Vs Baxndale. But to this knowledge, which a contract breaker is assumes to possess, whether he actually possesses or not, there may have to be added in a particular case, knowledge which he actually possesses of special circumstances outside the ordinary course of thing of such a kind that a breach on those special circumstances would be liable to cause more loss. Such a case attracts the operation of the second rule so as to make additional loss also recoverable.
v) In order to make the contract breaker liable under either rule it is not necessary that he should actually have asked himself what loss is liable to result from a breach. As has often been pointed out, parties at the time of contracting contemplate not the breach of the contract, but its performance. It suffices that if he had considered the question, he would as a reasonable man have concluded that the loss in question was liable to result.
vi) Nor, finally, to make a particular loss recoverable, need it be proved that upon a given state of knowledge the defendant could as a reasonable man, forces that a breach must necessarily result in that loss. It is enough if he could foresee it was likely so to result. It is indeed enough if the loss for some factor without which it would not have occurred is a serious possibility or a real danger."
- The above principles apply to grant of compensation under Section 73 of the Contract Act. This is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Karsandas H. Thacker Vs. Saran Engineering Co. Ltd. AIR 1965 SC 1981. The Supreme Court held that when a party commits breach of contract, the other party is entitled to receive compensation for any loss by the damage caused to him which naturally arose in the usual course of business from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. Remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach will not entitle the party complaining breach, to any compensation. Referring to the facts of the case and Illustration (k) to Section 73 of the Contract Act, the Supreme Court held:
"On account of the non-delivery of scrap iron, he could have purchased the scrap iron from the market at the same controlled price and similar incidental charges. This means that he did not stand to pay a higher price than what he was to pay to the respondent and therefore he could not have suffered any loss on account of the breach of contract by the respondent. The actual loss, which, according to the appellant, he suffered on account of the breach of contract by the respondent was the result of his contracting to sell 200 tons of scrap iron for export to the Export Corporation. It may be assumed that, as stated, the market price of scrap iron for export on January 30, 1953, was the price paid by the Export Corporation for the purchase of scrap iron that day. As the parties did not know and could not have known when the contract was made in July 1952 that the scrap iron would be ultimately sold by the appellant to the Export Corporation, the parties could not have known of the likelihood of the loss actually suffered by the appellant, according to him, on account of the failure of the respondent to fulfil the contract.
Illustration (k) to Section 73 of the Contract Act is apt for the purpose of this case. According to that illustration, the person committing breach of contract has to pay to the other party the difference between the contract price of the articles agreed to be sold and the sum paid by the other party for purchasing another article on account of the default of the first party, but the first party has not to pay the compensation which the second party had to pay to third parties as he had not been told at the time of the contract that the second party was making the purchase of the article for delivery to such third parties."
- Damages can be awarded only for the loss directly suffered on account of the breach and not for any remote or indirect loss sustained by reason of the breach of contract. The general rule is that where two parties enter into a contract and one of them commits breach, the other party will be entitled to receive as damages in respect of such breach of contract, such sum as may fairly and reasonably be considered arising naturally, that is according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. If any special circumstances about the dependency of the performance of other contract/s by the party complaining of the breach, on the performance of the contract in dispute by the party in breach, had been communicated to the party in breach, and thus known to both parties at the time of entering into the contract, then the damages for the breach of the contract in dispute, may include the compensation for the loss suffered in regard to such other dependent contracts. But, on the other hand, if the special circumstances were not made known to the party breaking the contract, the party breaking the contract, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in its contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally and directly and not any remote or unknown loss or damage.
- Therefore, the claimant's entitlement for special damages in the event of breach, would depend upon the respondent's knowledge of the facts at the time of entering into the contract, and not based on any subsequent event or subsequent information furnished by the claimant. Only if the claimant had informed the respondent about the special purpose for which it intended to use the revenue generated from the contract between them and further informed the respondent that it will be liable for any loss in that behalf, in the event of respondent committing breach, the respondent could be made liable for such loss.
- Section 74 of the said Act deals with compensation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for and the said Section reads as under: -
"When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for."
- What would be a 'penalty' under Section 74 of the Contract Act was explained by the Supreme Court of India in K.P. Subbarama Sastri and Ors. vs. K.S. Raghavan and Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 424, as under:
"The question whether a particular stipulation in a contractual agreement is in the nature of a penalty has to be determined by the court against the background of various relevant factors, such as the character of the transaction and its special nature, if any, the relative situation of the parties, the rights and obligations accruing from such a transaction under the general law and the intention of the parties in incorporating in the contract the particular stipulation which is contended to be penal in nature. If on such a comprehensive consideration, the court finds that the real purpose for which the stipulation was incorporated in the contract was that by reason of its burdensome or oppressive character it may operate in terrorem over the promise so as to drive him to fulfil the contract then the provision will be held to be one by way of penalty."
- More relevant and important to the issue in this case is the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Fateh Chand Vs Balkrishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405, where the various facets of Section 74 were considered and the legal position has been succinctly and authoritatively stated. The object of Section 74 of the Contract Act and the deviation of the Indian Law from the English common law on the subject have been explained by the Supreme Court thus –
"The section is clearly an attempt to eliminate the somewhat elaborate refinements made under the English common law in distinguishing between stipulations providing for payment of liquidated damages and stipulations in the nature of penalty. Under the common law a genuine pre-estimate of damages by mutual agreement is regarded as a stipulation naming liquidated damages and binding between the parties, stipulation in a contract in terrorem is a penalty and the Court refuses to enforce it, awarding to the aggrieved party only reasonable compensation. The Indian Legislature has sought to cut across the web of rules and presumptions under the English common law, by enacting a uniform principle applicable to all stipulations naming amounts to be paid in case of breach, and stipulations by way of penalty.
Section 74 declares the law as to liability upon breach of contract where compensation is by agreement of the parties pre-determined, or where there is a stipulation by way of penalty. But the application of the enactment is not restricted to cases where the aggrieved party claims relief as a plaintiff. The section does not confer a special benefit upon any party; it merely declares the law that notwithstanding any term in the contract predetermining damages or providing for forfeiture of any property by way of penalty, the court will award to the party aggrieved only reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named or penalty stipulated. The jurisdiction of the court is not determined by the accidental circumstance of the party in default being a plaintiff or a defendant in a suit. Use of the expression "to receive from the party who has broken the contract" does not predicate that the jurisdiction of the court to adjust amounts which have been paid by the party in default cannot be exercised in dealing with the claim of the party complaining of breach of contract. The court has to adjudge in every case reasonable compensation to which the plaintiff is entitled from the defendant on breach of the contract. Such compensation has to be ascertained having regard to the conditions existing on the date of the breach."
- The Supreme Court considered the question whether Section 74 applied to stipulation for forfeiture of amounts deposited or paid under the contract. It considered the contention that Section 74 dealt in terms, with the right to receive from the party who has broken the contract, reasonable compensation and not the right to forfeit what has already been received by the party aggrieved. The Supreme Court overruling the decisions of the Bombay High Court and Madras High Court (in Abdul Gani & Co. Vs Trustees of the Port of Bombay – AIR 1952 Bom 310, and Natesa Aiyar Vs Appervu Padayachi – AIR 1915 Mad 8986) held that Section 74 would apply to stipulation for forfeiture of amount deposited / paid under the contract. The relevant potions are extracted below: -
"There is however no warrant for the assumption made by some of the High Courts in India, that S. 74 applies only to cases where the aggrieved party is seeking to receive some amount on breach of contract and not to cases where upon breach of contract an amount received under the contract is sought to be forfeited. In our judgment the expression "the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty" comprehensively applies to every covenant involving a penalty whether it is for payment on breach of contract of money or delivery of property in future, or for forfeiture of right to money or other property already delivered. Duty not to enforce the penalty clause but only to award reasonable compensation is statutorily imposed upon courts by S. 74. In all cases, therefore, where there is a stipulation in the nature of penalty for forfeiture of an amount deposited pursuant to the terms of contract which expressly provides for forfeiture, the court has jurisdiction to award such sum only as it considers reasonable, but not exceeding the amount specified in the contract as liable to forfeiture.
The words "to be paid" which appear in the first condition do not qualify the second condition relating to stipulation by way of penalty. The expression "if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty" widens the operation of the section so as to make it applicable to all stipulations by way of penalty, whether the stipulation is to pay an amount of money, or is of another character, as, for example, providing for forfeiture of money already paid. There is nothing in the expression which implies that the stipulation must be one for rendering something after the contract is broken. There is no ground for holding that the expression "contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty" is limited to cases of stipulation in the nature of an agreement to pay money or deliver property on breach and does not comprehend covenants under which amounts paid or property delivered under the contract, which by the terms of the contract expressly or by clear implication are liable to be forfeited."
- What should be the measure of damages and in what manner such damages in a case falling under Section 74 should be awarded, were also explained by the Supreme Court, thus:
"Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act deals with the measure of damages in two classes of cases (i) where the contract names a sum to be paid in case of breach and (ii) where the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty. We are in the present case not concerned to decide whether a covenant of forfeiture of deposit for due performance of a contract falls within the first class. The measure of damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by S. 74 reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for. In assessing damages the Court has, subject to the limit of the penalty stipulated, jurisdiction to award such compensation as it deems reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Jurisdiction of the Court to award compensation in case of breach of contract is unqualified except as to the maximum stipulated; but compensation has to be reasonable, and that imposes upon the Court duty to award compensation according to settled principles. The section undoubtedly says that the aggrieved party is entitled to receive compensation from the party who has broken the contract, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused by the breach. Thereby it merely dispenses with proof of "actual loss or damages"; it does not justify the award of compensation when in consequence of the breach no legal injury at all has resulted, because compensation for breach of contract can be awarded to make good loss or damage which naturally arose in the usual course of things, or which the parties knew when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach."
- In the above case considered by it, the Supreme Court dealt with an Agreement of Sale dated 21.03.1949 under which plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant, an immovable property for Rs.1,12,500/-. The agreement acknowledged the receipt of Rs.1,000/- as earnest money deposit and provided that the purchaser shall pay a sum of Rs. 24,000/- out of the sale price at the time of delivery of possession on 30.03.1949, and that the purchaser should get the sale deed registered on or before 01.06.1949 by paying the balance price. It further provided that if, for any reason, the purchaser failed to get the sale deed registered within the date stipulated, then the said sum of Rs.25,000/- (that is Rs.1000/- + Rs.24,000/-) shall be deemed to be forfeited, the agreement cancelled and the purchaser shall be liable to deliver back the possession of the property to the vendor. In pursuance of the agreement, apart from earnest money of Rs.1000/- paid at the time of execution of the agreement, purchaser paid Rs.24,000/- on 25.3.1949 and took possession. But the sale was not completed within the time stipulated in the agreement. Each party blamed the other for the failure to complete the sale in terms of the agreement. The plaintiff (seller) filed a suit contending that the agreement was rescinded in view of the breach committed by the defendant (buyer), that the sum of Rs.25,000/- paid by the defendant had stood forfeited and prayed for re-delivery of possession of the property, apart from compensation for wrongful use and occupation of the property. The trial court held that the plaintiff had failed to put the defendant in possession of the land agreed to be sold and therefore he could not retain Rs.25,000/- and directed the defendant to put the plaintiff back in possession of the property on the plaintiff depositing Rs.25,000/- less mesne profits of Rs.1,400. In appeal, the High Court declared that the plaintiff was entitled to retain out of Rs.25,000, a sum of Rs.11,250 as compensation for the loss suffered. Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the covenant in the agreement which gave to the plaintiff the right to forfeit Rs.24,000 paid by the defendant towards sale price was a stipulation in the nature of the penalty and the plaintiff could retain that amount or any part thereof only if he established that as a consequence of the breach by the defendant, he suffered loss and in the view of the court, the amount or part thereof, was reasonable compensation for that loss. The Supreme Court agreed with the contention and held that the sum of Rs.24,000 paid towards sale price was not of the nature of an earnest money paid as security for du performance of the contract. It observed –
"It cannot be assumed that because there is a stipulation for forfeiture, the amount paid must bear the character of deposit for due performance of the contract."
By applying the principles of Section 74, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to retain only the earnest money of Rs.1,000 from out of Rs.25,000 received by him and the sum of R.24,000 paid towards part of sale price could not be forfeited in the following reasoning: -
"The plaintiff failed to prove the loss suffered by him in consequence of the breach of the contract committed by the defendant, and we are unable to find any principle on which compensation equal to ten percent of the agreed price could be awarded to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has been allowed Rs. 1,000/- which was the earnest money as part of the damages. Besides he had use of the remaining sum of Rs. 24,000/-, and we can rightly presume that he must have been deriving advantage from that amount throughout this period. In the absence therefore of any proof of damage arising from the breach of the contract we are of opinion that the amount of Rs. 1,000/- (earnest money) which has been forfeited, and the advantage that the plaintiff must have derived from the possession of the remaining sum of Rs. 24,000/- during all this period would be sufficient compensation to him."
- The above legal position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Maula Bux Vs Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1955 and Union of India Vs Raman Iron Foundry, AIR 1974 SC 1265.
In Maula Bux, interpreting Section 74 of the Contract Act, the Supreme Court held: -
"Under the terms of the agreements the amounts deposited by the plaintiff as security for due performance of the contracts were to stand forfeited in case the plaintiff neglected to perform his part of the contract. The High Court observed that the deposits so made may be regarded as earnest money. But that view cannot be accepted. According to Earl Jowitt in "The Dictionary of English Law" at p. 689 : "Giving an earnest or earnest-money is a mode of signifying assent to a contract of sale or the like, by giving to the vendor a nominal sum (e.g. a shilling) as a token that the parties are in earnest or have made up their minds." As observed by the Judicial Committee in Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup A.I.R.1926 P.C]
Earnest money is part of the purchase price when the transaction goes forward: it is forfeited when the transaction falls through, by reason of the fault or failure of the vendee.
In the present case the deposit was made not of a sum of money by the purchaser to be applied towards part payment of the price when the contract was completed and till then as evidencing an intention on the part of the purchaser to buy property or goods. Here the plaintiff had deposited the amounts claimed as security for guaranteeing due performance of the contracts. Such deposits cannot be regarded as earnest money.
Forfeiture of earnest money under a contract for sale of property-movable or immovable-if the amount is reasonable, does not fall within Section 74. That has been decided in several cases : Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup A.I.R.1926 P.C.1 RoshanLal v. The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd., Delhi I.L.R. All.166 Muhammad Habibullah v. Muhammad Shafi I.L.R. All. 324 Bishan Chand v. Radha Kishan Das I.D. 19 All. 490.; These cases are easily explained, for forfeiture of a reasonable amount paid as earnest money does not amount to imposing a penalty. But if forfeiture is of the nature of penalty, Section 74 applies. Where under the terms of the contract the party in breach has undertaken to pay a sum of money or to forfeit a sum of money which he has already paid to the party complaining of a breach of contract, the undertaking is of the nature of a penalty.
....It is true that in every case of breach of contract the person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by him before he can claim a decree, and the Court is competent to award reasonable compensation in case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of the breach of contract. But the expression "whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby" is intended to cover different classes of contracts which come before the Courts. In case of breach of some contracts it may be impossible for the Court to assess compensation arising from breach, while in other cases compensation can be calculated in accordance with established rules. Where the Court is unable to assess the compensation, the sum named by the parties if it be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate may be taken into consideration as the measure of reasonable compensation, but not if the sum named is in the nature of a penalty. Where loss in terms of money can be determined, the party claiming compensation must prove the loss suffered by him."
In Raman Iron Foundry, the Supreme Court observed:
"Now the law is well settled that a claim for unliquidated damages does not give rise to a debt until the liability is adjudicated and damages assessed by a decree or order of a Court or other adjudicatory authority. When there is a breach of contract, the party who commits the breach does not eo instanti incur any pecuniary obligation, nor does the party complaining of the breach becomes entitled to a debt due from the other party. The only right which the party aggrieved by the breach of the contract has is the right to sue for damages."
- In State of Kerala Vs Messrs United Shippers and Dredgers Ltd., AIR 1982 Ker. 281, the Kerala High Court held:
"The Indian Legislature in giving shape to Section 74 of the Act resolved to do away with two significant features of English Common Law. One is the distinction between liquidated damages enforceable in Court of law and penalties against which relief would be given. Both these situations have been brought together in Section 74 of the Act thus doing away with the distinction between the two maintained by the English Common Law. Under Section 74 of the Act. Whether it is a case of liquidated damage? or penalty, what the party faced with the breach gets is only reasonable compensation, subject to the limit of the amount stipulated in the contract itself. The second point of departure is that while in English Common Law penalty clause has to be completely ignored and the party claiming compensation has to prove the extent of loss or damage suffered in fact or actually, and obtain compensation on that basis, Section 74 dispenses with such proof of the extent of real or actual or factual loss or damage, but provides for grant of reasonable compensation, subject to the condition that it shall not exceed the sum stipulated as penalty in the contract. The proof of the extent of loss or damage suffered in fact, i.e. proof of extent of actual damage or loss suffered is sought to be dispensed with in Section 74 of the Act. It is only in this light that the expression "whether or not actual damage or low is proved to have been caused thereby" has been introduced in Section 74 of the Act. This historical background of the provision would explain the purport of Section 74 of the Act."
- In the recent judgment of Kailash Nath Associates Vs DDA & Another, (2015) 4 SCC 136, the Hon'ble Apex Court on the conspectus of all the authorities noted therein, summarized the law on compensation for breach of contract under Section 74 as follows: -
"43. On a conspectus of the above authorities, the law on compensation for breach of contract Under Section 74 can be stated to be as follows:
1. Where a sum is named in a contract as a liquidated amount payable by way of damages, the party complaining of a breach can receive as reasonable compensation such liquidated amount only if it is a genuine pre-estimate of damages fixed by both parties and found to be such by the Court. In other cases, where a sum is named in a contract as a liquidated amount payable by way of damages, only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the amount so stated. Similarly, in cases where the amount fixed is in the nature of penalty, only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the penalty so stated. In both cases, the liquidated amount or penalty is the upper limit beyond which the Court cannot grant reasonable compensation.
2. Reasonable compensation will be fixed on well-known principles that are applicable to the law of contract, which are to be found inter alia in Section 73 of the Contract Act.
3. Since Section 74 awards reasonable compensation for damage or loss caused by a breach of contract, damage or loss caused is a sine qua non for the applicability of the Section.
4. The Section applies whether a person is a Plaintiff or a Defendant in a suit.
5. The sum spoken of may already be paid or be payable in future.
6. The expression "whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby" means that where it is possible to prove actual damage or loss, such proof is not dispensed with. It is only in cases where damage or loss is difficult or impossible to prove that the liquidated amount named in the contract, if a genuine pre-estimate of damage or loss, can be awarded.
7. Section 74 will apply to cases of forfeiture of earnest money under a contract. Where, however, forfeiture takes place under the terms and conditions of a public auction before agreement is reached, Section 74 would have no application."
- The same has also been observed by the Delhi High Court that even assuming the proposed buyer is guilty of breach of contract and has failed to go ahead with the agreement to sell by getting the sale deed executed in favour of the proposed buyer, yet, in view of the aforenoted judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the proposed seller cannot forfeit the entire amount and directed that in the absence of any clause entitling forfeiture in the contract and there being no pleading or evidence of any loss being caused to the proposed seller on account of the breach of the contract, they cannot forfeit the amount, and directed return of the same with interest (Refer "Shri Ranbir Singh & Another Vs Shri Bhup Singh & Others", MANU/DE/2519/2015; "Shri Sunil Sehgal Vs Shri Chander Batra & Others", MANU/DE/2831/2015; and "Shri Manoj Tomar Vs Smt. Neena Khatter & Another", MANU/DE/3094/2015).
Authors' views are personal only.
(Mr. Faisal Sherwani is an Advocate – on - Record at the Supreme Court of India and is currently a Partner in the Dispute Resolution Practice at L&L Partners Law Offices, New Delhi. Mr. Achal Gupta is an Advocate and a qualified Chartered Accountant. He is currently a Senior Associate in the Dispute Resolution Practice at L&L Partners Law Offices, New Delhi).
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.