On May 31, 2011 the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Federal Circuit's application of its "deliberate indifference" test in SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360 (2010), was inappropriate to establish the knowledge required for inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), but that a defendant's "willful blindness" could, alternatively, be used to satisfy this knowledge requirement.
Background of the Global-Tech decision
Inducement is a theory of indirect patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) provides that "[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." To establish active inducement, a plaintiff must generally show that: (1) a direct infringement occurred, (2) the defendant's actions induced this direct infringement, and (3) the defendant had a specific intent to induce infringement.1
In its decision in SEB, the Federal Circuit addressed the scope of knowledge required for a defendant to have a specific intent to induce infringement. The Federal Circuit found that a direct showing of a defendant's actual knowledge of the patent was not necessary.2 The court did not establish, however, an objective standard for what would be necessary. Instead, it found that the knowledge requirement could be satisfied by a subjective test — a showing of the defendant's "deliberate indifference of a known risk" that the plaintiff had a protective patent.3 The Federal Circuit rationalized this on the grounds that such a deliberate disregard by a defendant was, in actuality, a form of actual knowledge. Applying this test to the case at bar, the court found that the record contained adequate evidence that the defendant, Pentalpha, had deliberately disregarded a known risk that the plaintiff, SEB, had a patent. Pentalpha copied all but the cosmetics of SEB's patented product, a deep fryer. Pentalpha also hired an attorney to conduct a right-to-use analysis, but did not inform him of this copying, and the company's president was well-versed in patent law and understood plaintiff to be as well.4
The U.S. Supreme Court responded as follows.
1. Is the "deliberate indifference" test an appropriate standard for finding knowledge under § 271(b)?
No. The Supreme Court ruled that
"deliberate indifference" does not satisfy the knowledge
requirement under § 271(b).5 The Court criticized
this test as allowing a finding of "knowledge" when there
is merely a "known risk."6 The Court also
criticized this test as demanding only "deliberate
indifference" to this risk, instead of "active efforts by
an inducer to avoid knowing about the infringing nature of the
activities."7
While the Court thus eschewed the Federal Circuit's test, it
did rule that the knowledge requirement in § 271(b)
could be satisfied by willful blindness.8 The
Court found that "willful blindness" includes two basic
requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that
there is a high probability that a fact exists, and (2) the
defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning that
fact.9 The Court looked to criminal law in reaching this
conclusion, where it found that courts apply "willful
blindness" to hold that "defendants cannot escape the
reach of ... statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from
clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the
circumstances."10 The Court apparently felt that
the "willful blindness" standard could be used to extend
liability to those defendants who are "just as culpable as
those who have actual knowledge" of a patent, but at the same
time was appropriately limited in scope (in that, for example, the
standard is a higher threshold than recklessness or
negligence).11 Justice Kennedy dissented from the
Court's opinion, arguing that "[w]illful blindness is not
knowledge; and judges should not broaden a legislative prescription
by analogy."12
2. Did defendant Pentalpha "willfully blind"
itself and have the knowledge required for inducement under §
271(b)?
Yes. Although the Federal Circuit had not applied
the Supreme Court's "willful blindness" standard, the
Supreme Court found that the evidence on record was sufficient
under its standard.13 In finding that Pentalpha
willfully blinded itself to the infringing nature of the sales it
encouraged others to make, the Court relied on many of the same
facts that the Federal Circuit had under its test —
Pentalpha copied all but the cosmetics of SEB's patented deep
fryer, Pentalpha did not inform the attorney it hired to conduct a
right-of-use analysis of this copying, and Pentalpha's
president was well-versed in patent law.14
Looking forward after Global-Tech
The Court's decision arguably further heightens the showing
that a plaintiff must make for a defendant to be liable for active
inducement of infringement under § 271(b). In the absence of
actual knowledge, a plaintiff will now have to establish a
defendant's subjective belief that there is a high probability
that the relevant product is patented, and then must show
deliberate actions that the defendant took to avoid learning this
fact. Correspondingly, opinions of counsel, such as prior art
searches and noninfringement opinions, will likely continue to play
an important role in potentially avoiding liability under §
271(b). Companies obtaining such opinions, however, should avoid
the mistakes that befell Pentalpha, and be sure to first inform
their patent attorneys conducting such an analysis of any
third-party products or services that may have served as an
inspiration for the company's new product or service. Companies
should also consider informing their attorneys of other key facts
they have knowledge of that may facilitate the search and analysis,
such as known close products or services they have reviewed.
The fact that the Supreme Court has arguably heightened the
standard for proving knowledge for indirect infringement under
§ 271(b) is further notable because the Federal Circuit has
recently limited direct infringement in other contexts, potentially
forcing plaintiffs to rely on such an indirect infringement theory
in certain instances. For example, the Federal Circuit recently
found that, for systems claims where the end user's acts
satisfy certain claim limitations and a company's acts satisfy
others, the company cannot be liable for direct infringement unless
it puts the system as a whole into service (i.e., controls the
system and obtains a benefit from it).15 In many
instances, however, the end user will put the system into service
(i.e., "use" the system), and thus plaintiffs may be
forced to rely on a theory of indirect infringement such as active
inducement.
Footnotes
1 See, e.g., i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010); DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006); SEB, 594 F.3d at 1377.
2 SEB, 594 F.3d at 1377.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1377-78.
5 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., Slip Op. at 10.
6 Id. at 14.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 12.
9 Id. at 13.
10 Id. at 10.
11 Id. at 10, 14.
12 Kennedy Dissent at 1.
13 Slip Op. at 14.
14 Id. at 14-16.
15 Centillion Data Systems v. Qwest Comm. Int'l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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